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PRINCIPLES-BASED SECURITIES REGULATION IN THE
WAKE OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
Cristie Ford*
T

he recent global financial crisis contains
cautionary lessons about the risks associated
with principles-based regulation when it is not
reinforced by an effective regulatory presence.
Our response to the crisis, however, should not
be a rush to enact more rules-based regulatory
approaches. On the contrary, principles-based
securities regulation offers more viable solutions to the challenges that such a crisis presents for contemporary financial markets regulation.
The author draws on the lesson of the
global financial crisis to identify three critical
factors for effective principles-based securities
regulation. First, regulators must have the necessary capacity in terms of numbers, access to
information, and expertise in order to act as an
effective counterweight to industry. Second,
regulation needs to grapple with the impact of
complexity on financial markets and their regulation. Third, increased diversity among regulators and greater independence from industry
are required to avoid conflicts of interest, overreliance on market discipline, and “groupthink”.
The paper calls for a continuing commitment to
principles-based regulation, accompanied by
meaningful enforcement and oversight.

*

L

a récente crise financière mondiale nous
invite à tirer une leçon de prudence quant aux
risques associés à la réglementation fondée sur
des principes lorsque cette réglementation n’est
pas renforcée par une présence réglementaire
efficace. Nous ne devrions toutefois pas nous
empresser d’adopter davantage de réglementations fondées sur des règles. Au contraire, la réglementation des valeurs mobilières basée sur
des principes offre des solutions plus viables
aux défis que pose une telle crise.
En se fondant sur les leçons tirées de la
crise financière mondiale, l’auteure identifie
trois facteurs critiques pour assurer l’efficacité
d’une réglementation des valeurs mobilières
fondée sur des principes. Premièrement, les organismes régulateurs doivent disposer des
moyens nécessaires en termes d’effectifs, d’accès
à l’information et d’expertise s’ils veulent
contrebalancer l’industrie de façon efficace.
Deuxièmement, la réglementation doit être aux
prises avec l’impact de la complexité sur les
marchés financiers et sur leur réglementation.
Troisièmement, une plus grande diversité des
organismes de réglementation et une plus
grande indépendance face à l’industrie sont requises pour éviter les conflits d’intérêts, la
confiance excessive en la discipline du marché
et la « pensée de groupe ». L’article appelle à un
engagement continu envers la réglementation
fondée sur des principes, accompagnée d’une
application et d’une surveillance significatives.
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Introduction
These remain early days to try to assess the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) and subsequent regulatory reform efforts on national
and transnational financial markets regulation. That said, it is important
to continue to assess events “on the fly” given how quickly reform efforts
are evolving, how uncertain the future continues to be, and how pressing
the need is to implement reforms in Canada and abroad.
This paper considers a particular aspect of regulatory design: principles-based regulation. It seeks to re-examine (and indeed to restate the
case for) principles-based securities regulation, in light of the GFC and related developments. It argues against an overly hasty rush to more rulesbased formulations. Prior to the onset of the crisis, the concept of more
principles-based financial regulation was gaining traction in regulatory
practice and policy circles.1 In Canada, steps were being taken to develop
more principles-based securities regulation under the leadership of a proposed new national securities regulator. The federal government’s Expert
Panel on Securities Regulation (Expert Panel), chaired by the Honourable
Tom Hockin, was struck in February 2008 with a mandate to provide independent recommendations on how to improve the structure, content,
and enforcement of securities regulation in Canada. It released its final
report on 12 January 2009, recommending inter alia that Canada adopt a
more principles-based approach.2 On 22 June 2009, Doug Hyndman, longtime Chair of the British Columbia Securities Commission (BCSC), was
appointed to a two-year term as chair of Canada’s transition office for a
new national securities regulator.3 Hyndman, along with Vice Chair

1

See U.K., Financial Services Authority, Principles-Based Regulation: Focusing on the
Outcomes That Matter (London: Financial Services Authority, 2007), online: Financial
Services Authority <http://www.fsa.gov.uk> [Focusing on the Outcomes]; History of the
2004 B.C. Securities Legislation, online: British Columbia Securities Commission
<http://www.bcsc.bc.ca> [2004 B.C. Securities]; Cristie L. Ford, “New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation” (2008) 45 Am. Bus. L.J. 1 at 12, n.
45 [Ford, “New Governance”]; Julia Black et al., “Making a Success of Principles-Based
Regulation” (2007) 1(3) L. & Financial Markets Rev. 191 [Black, “Making a Success”].
Cf. Lawrence A. Cunningham, “A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of ‘PrinciplesBased Systems’ in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting” (2007) 60
Vand. L. Rev. 1411 [Cunningham, “Retire the Rhetoric”].

2

Canada, Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, Creating an Advantage in Capital
Markets: Final Report and Recommendations (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 2009) at
17, online: Expert Panel on Securities Regulation <http://www.expertpanel.ca> [Capital
Markets].

3

Department of Finance Canada, News Release, 2009-064 “Minister of Finance Announces Launch of Canadian Securities Regulator Transition Office” (22 June 2009),
online: Department of Finance Canada <http://www.fin.gc.ca >. The federal government
is also seeking a reference opinion from the Supreme Court of Canada on the constitutionality of a national securities regulator. See Steven Chase & Rhéal Séguin, “Ottawa
sets off constitutional battle over regulator” The Globe and Mail (17 October 2009) A1.
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Brent Aitken, has been the driving force behind the BCSC’s principlesbased approach and could be expected to bring that commitment to his
new role.
In the interim between the Expert Panel’s creation and its final report, of course, global credit markets froze, stock market values went into
free fall, Wall Street investment banks collapsed, major financial institutions were bailed out on an unprecedented scale, and financial regulatory
systems internationally were cast into doubt.4 A flurry of ambitious reform proposals followed. Among others, in March 2009 Lord Adair Turner
released the Turner Review in the United Kingdom, subtitled A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis,5 and major financial markets
regulatory reform has been proposed in both the United Kingdom and the
United States.6 Several major domestic and international policy bodies7
and a number of scholars8 have contributed to the conversation. Along
with such reform proposals came a turn, in some quarters, against principles-based regulation.9

4

For a timeline of the crisis, see R.M. Schneiderman, “A Year of Financial Turmoil” The
New York Times (11 September 2009), online: The New York Times
<http://www.nytimes.com>.

5

U.K., Financial Services Authority, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the
Global Banking Crisis (London: Financial Services Authority, 2009), online: Financial
Services Authority <http://www.fsa.gov.uk>.

6

See e.g. Department of the Treasury, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation:
Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation (2009), online: Financial Stability for
the American Economy <http://www.financialstability.gov > [Department of the Treasury, Financial Regulatory Reform]; U.K., Her Majesty’s Treasury, Reforming Financial
Markets (London: The Stationery Office, 2009), online: Her Majesty’s Treasury
<http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/reforming_financial_markets080709.pdf>.

7

See e.g. Switzerland, Bank for International Settlements, 79th Annual Report: 1 April
2008–31 March 2009 (29 June 2009), online: Bank for International Settlements
<http://www.bis.org>; Ana Carvajal et al., The Perimeter of Financial Regulation (26
March 2009), online: International Monetary Fund <https://www.imf.org >.

8

See e.g. John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, “Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury
Have a Better Idea?” (2009) 95 Va. L. Rev. 707; Luigi Zingales, “A New Regulatory
Framework: Three Agencies, Based on the Three Main Goals of Financial Regulation”,
online: (2009) 19:2 City Journal <http://www.city-journal.org>. Others have sounded
more cautionary notes about the rush to reform. See generally Luca Enriques, “Regulators’ Response to the Current Crisis and the Upcoming Reregulation of Financial Markets: One Reluctant Regulator’s View” (2009) 30 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 1147 (arguing that reforms are driven by public relations concerns); Saule Omarova & Adam Feibelman,
“Risks, Rules, and Institutions: A Process for Reforming Financial Regulation,” (2009)
39 U. Mem. L. Rev. 881 (raising concerns that reforms initiated during a period of crisis
management may not be optimal, and suggesting a careful three-step approach to regulatory reform).

9

See e.g. Felix Salmon, “The US move to principles-based regulation” Reuters (17 June
2009), online: Reuters <http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/06/17/the-us-move-to-
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This paper argues that the GFC does not discredit principles-based
regulation, as that form of regulation is properly understood. On the contrary, principles-based securities regulation remains a viable and even
necessary policy option: it offers solutions to the practical and theoretical
challenges that the GFC presents to contemporary financial markets
regulation. What the crisis actually demonstrates is how damaging a laissez-faire mindset on the part of regulators can be to any form of regulation, including principles-based regulation. Adopting principles-based
regulation does not mean doing away with rules. Rather, it is a particular
approach to structuring regulation that includes rules. It gives legislatures the power to set high-level regulatory goals and outcomes, and
leaves the articulation of processes and details to front-line regulators in
collaboration with industry itself. Fundamental to principles-based regulation is the development of a functional and effective “interpretive community” that includes industry participants, regulators, and other stakeholders in ongoing communication around the content of regulatory principles.
The experience of the GFC is a lesson about what happens when regulators fail to participate actively and skeptically in that interpretive community. Principles-based regulation is premised on concepts of “coregulation”, or “enforced self-regulation”, but the GFC illustrates how
such models can slide into bare self-regulation in the absence of meaningful regulatory oversight and engagement. Our response should not be to
re-embrace more rules-based regulatory approaches. Financial markets
are too fast-moving and complex to be regulated in a command-andcontrol manner, and the risk of Enron-style “loophole behaviour” associated with rules is too great.10 Instead, we can draw on the lesson of the
GFC to identify three critical success factors for effective principles-based
securities regulation.
First, regulators need to have the necessary capacity in terms of numbers, access to information, expertise, and perspective to act as an effective counterweight to industry as the content of principles is developed.
Second, regulation needs to grapple with the impact of complexity on financial markets and their regulation. Effective regulation should reflect
an appropriately granulated understanding of kinds of complexity and
their effects, and reject the notion that innovation is by definition beneficial. It may also mean considering whether some regulatory requirements
(e.g., capital requirements) are best cast as bright-line “prophylactic
rules”, which at least in the short term may limit complexity and conserve
regulatory resources. Finally, this paper suggests that the lack of diverprinciples-based-regulation/> (the author notes that in his newsroom, he is in “a minority of one” for continuing to advocate for principles-based regulation).
10
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sity and independence among regulators and industry may have contributed to conflicts of interest, overreliance on market discipline, and “groupthink” in the run-up to the GFC. The appropriate response may be a move
away from an expertise-based, technocratic model toward a more broadly
participatory one. The paper closes with a call for a continuing commitment to principles-based regulation, accompanied by the indispensable
implementation piece—meaningful enforcement and oversight.

I. Principles and Rules in Theory and Practice
Principles-based capital markets regulation has been a salient policy
topic in recent years in many jurisdictions including Canada, the United
States, and the United Kingdom.11 In terms of actual practice, the U.K.
Financial Services Authority (FSA) has been a thought leader on principles-based financial regulation.12 In Canada, the province of British Columbia tried to promulgate a new, more principles-based Securities Act in
2004. Although that proposed act has not been brought into force, the
BCSC has since adopted a more principles-based approach to how it administers its existing act..13 Derivative products in the United States and
Canada also tend to be regulated in a more principles-based manner.14

11

See e.g. Purdy Crawford et al., eds., Crawford Panel on a Single Canadian Securities
Regulator: Blueprint for a Canadian Securities Commission (7 June 2006), online:
Crawford Panel <http://www.crawfordpanel.ca> (“to provide Canadian capital markets
with a competitive advantage globally, it is desirable to have as much principles-based
regulation as is feasible” at 12); Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada: Canada Steps Up, vol. 1, online: Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in
Canada ‹http://www.tfmsl.ca› (recommending that securities regulation be based “at
every available opportunity” on “clearly enunciated regulatory principles which do not
need a detailed set of interventionist rules for sound implementation” at 50); U.S., Department of the Treasury, Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure
(Washington: Department of the Treasury, 2008) at 106-16 (recommending a merged
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)- Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) entity that adopts the CFTC’s principles-based approach); U.S., Committee
on Capital Markets Regulation, Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets
Regulation (Cambridge, Mass.: 2006), online: Committee on Capital Markets Regulation <http://www.capmktsreg.org> (arguing that the SEC and self-regulatory organizations should move to a more “risk-based and principles-based” process (at 8)).

12

Focusing on the Outcomes, supra note 1; Black, “Making a Success”, supra note 1; Cristie Ford, “Principles-Based Securities Regulation” (2009), online: Expert Panel on Securities Regulation <http://www.expertpanel.ca> [Ford, “Securities Regulation”] (describing the main components of the FSA regulatory approach as: a hybrid rules and principles structure; extensive consultation with industry actors; a management-based, outcome-oriented, and risk-based regulatory approach; and an emphasis on compliance
and supervision as opposed to ex post enforcement).

13

See Submission of the British Columbia Securities Commission, online: British Columbia Securities Commission <http://www.bcsc.bc.ca > [Submission BCSC].

14

See e.g. Walter Lukken, “It’s a Matter of Principles” (Lecture delivered at the University of Houston’s Global Energy Management Institute, 25 January 2007), online:
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Most recently in Canada, as noted above, the Expert Panel chaired by the
Honourable Tom Hockin has recommended that a proposed national securities regulator adopt a more principles-based approach to securities regulation.15
At the theoretical level, the distinction between rules and principles,
and their relative advantages and disadvantages, have been quite well
canvassed.16 Generally speaking, rules are considered to have the advantages of being more precise and certain, but the consequent disadvantages
of being potentially rigid, reactive, and insensitive to context and therefore inevitable over- or under-inclusive. They may also promote or permit
“loophole” behaviour, and be more easily “gamed” by sophisticated actors.
In comparison, principles are more flexible, more sensitive to context, and
therefore potentially fairer when applied. On the other hand, principles
can be uncertain, unpredictable, and difficult and costly to interpret. Because they allocate substantial decision making to front-line decision
makers, they can also permit arbitrary conduct and regulatory overreaching.
A simple example that has been used to illustrate the difference between rules and principles involves speed limits.17 A speed limit framed as
a rule will prohibit driving faster than a precise numerical limit, for example, 90 kilometres per hour. The rule sets out, in advance and with
precision, the boundary of acceptable conduct. This leaves very little discretion to the front line decision maker, who only needs to determine

Commodity Futures Trading Commission <http://www.cftc.gov >; Bill 77, Derivatives
Act, 1st Sess., 38th Leg., Quebec, 2008 (assented to 20 June 2008), S.Q. 2008, c. 24
[QDA].
15

Capital Markets, supra note 2 at 22. The Expert Panel also developed draft legislation
for its national securities regulator. See “Draft Securities Act”, online: Expert Panel on
Securities Regulation <http://www.expertpanel.ca> [“Draft Securities Act”].

16

See especially Carol M. Rose, “Crystals and Mud in Property Law” (1988) 40 Stan. L.
Rev. 577; Kathleen M. Sullivan, “ The Justices of Rules and Standards”, Foreward, The
Supreme Court, 1991 Term, (1992) 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22; Pierre Schlag, “Rules and
Standards” (1985) 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379; Frederick Schauer, “The Tyranny of Choice
and the Rulification of Standards” (2005) 14 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 803; Antonin
Scalia, “The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules” (1989) 56 U. Chicago L. Rev. 1175; Louis
Kaplow, “Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis” (1992) 42 Duke L.J. 557;
Duncan Kennedy, “Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication” (1976) 89 Harv.
L. Rev. 1685; Cass R. Sunstein, “Problems with Rules” (1995) 83 Cal. L. Rev. 953.
Scholars working specifically in securities regulation, accounting, and tax have looked
at how rules or principles affect industry behaviour, and how to choose between rules
and principles in particular situations. See e.g. William W. Bratton, “Enron, SarbanesOxley and Accounting: Rules versus Principles versus Rents” (2003) 48 Vill. L. Rev.
1023; James J. Park, “The Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation” (2007) 57
Duke L. J. 625; Mark W. Nelson, “Behavioural Evidence on the Effects of Principlesand Rules-Based Standards” (2003) 17 Accouting Horizons 91.

17

See Kaplow, supra note 16 at 559-60; Sullivan, supra note 16 at 58-59.
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whether the car in question was exceeding that predetermined and nonnegotiable limit. By contrast, a speed limit framed in principles based
terms would be something like a prohibition on driving faster than is
“reasonable and prudent in all the circumstances.” This was, in fact, how
the state of Montana framed its speed limits for several years. The nonnumerical “reasonableness” standard has the ability to take context –
such as road and environmental conditions, time of day, driver’s experience, etc. – into account. As a consequence, it also allocates substantial
decision making power to the front line decision maker, who must use her
judgment to determine what “reasonable and prudent” driving constitutes
in all the circumstances. 18 It should be emphasized that speed limits involve very different background conditions than securities regulation does
in terms of (among other things) the complexity of the subject matter, the
scope for and fluidity of potential wrongdoing, and the expertise of the
front line decision maker.19 The two are not really analogous. That said,
it is noteworthy that Montana repealed its principles based speed limit in
1999, after the Montana Supreme Court held it to be so vague as to violate the Due Process clause of the state constitution.
The terms are also useful at the systemic level, for describing practical
regulatory approaches.20 No workable system consists entirely of rules or
of principles, but different systems can be comparatively more rules- or
principles-based—a point the FSA has made by calling its world-leading

18

In the years prior to 1974, and from 1995 to 1999, Montana used a non-numerical, “reasonable and prudent” speed limit. The limit was subsequently repealed when it was
found to be so vague as to violate the Due Process Clause of the Montana Constitution.
See State of Montana v. Rudy Stanko, 1998 MT 321, 292 Mont. 214 (Mont. Sup. Ct.). On
the potential vagueness of principles in the securities law enforcement context, see
Ford, “Securities Regulation”, supra note 12 at 31-34.

19

This paper contests the idea that rules are more certain than a principles-based system
that is supported by a well-functioning interpretive community and adequate regulatory capacity. See “Complexity and Prophylactic Rules” below. However, it does not contest the idea that rules are more certain and principles more flexible in the abstract
(i.e., in the absence of a mechanism such as a careful, structured, ongoing multiparty
dialogue for working out the content of principles in a responsible manner). Of course,
even under ideal conditions, application will influence theory in direct and indirect
ways. For example, through application to real-life situations, principles acquire specific content on a constant, ongoing basis. Decision makers may interpret a rule “up” or
“down” (making it look more like a principle or more like a detailed rule) to make it fit a
specific situation. Principles, as well, when interpreted by multiple human beings in
multiple situations, may lose their high-level character, slide closer to rules, get fuzzy
around the edges, and otherwise drift and change (see e.g. Schauer, supra note 16).
Therefore, whether a regulatory system fosters clarity and predictability, for example,
is not entirely related to whether it is rules-based or principles-based. The real question
is whether regulators and regulatees have a shared understanding of what the regulations entail.

20

Cf. Cunningham, “Retire the Rhetoric”, supra note 1; Ford, “New Governance”, supra
note 1 at 12, n. 45.
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approach simply “more principles-based”.21 Statutory drafters and regulators can choose to regulate the same issues by way of different proportions
of detailed checklists, bright-line rules, or open-ended goal statements.22
In the context of statutory drafting, principles-based regulation means
legislation that contains more directives that are cast at a higher level of
generality. A principles-based system looks to principles first and uses
them, instead of detailed rules, wherever feasible. When confronted with
a new situation, a principles-based system first determines whether it can
be regulated under existing principles, and it resists the temptation to
create new, purpose-built rules.23 Yet even within a system that is generally principles-based, rules will always serve an essential purpose in enhancing clarity at key junctures, and buttressing ex post enforceability.”.
Rules and principles are also best understood as points on a continuum rather than discrete concepts, and there is a good deal of overlap and
convergence among them.24 Any complex regulatory system will be (and
should be) an amalgam of rules and principles. Here, the the public perception of “principles-based regulation” exhibits considerable confusion.
For example, 87.5 per cent of the seventy-five written submissions from
stakeholders to the Expert Panel were in favour of principles-based regulation.25 But of these submissions, a substantial number seemed to as-

21

Focusing on the Outcomes, supra note 1 at 4-5.

22

See Black, “Making a Success”, supra note 1 (identifying the distinction between brightline rules and detailed rules).

23

See e.g. BCSC on responses to the GFC:
To the extent that market professionals misrepresented the features or
risks of investment products, or sold unsuitable investments to unsophisticated investors, we already have rules against that type of conduct. Rather
than devising new rules for what is already illegal, we need to maintain and
adapt our compliance and enforcement processes to detect and deter this activity.
This is not to say that we should not consider rule changes …
Any new rule, however, should be based on thorough analysis that shows
it to be the best option for achieving a desired regulatory outcome. All too often, policymakers start with the presumption that a situation demands new
rules, and they lose focus on other options like enforcing existing requirements that could deal with the problem more quickly and effectively (08/09
Annual Report, online: British Columbia Securities Commission
<http://www.bcsc.bc.ca> at 3).

24

See e.g. Russell B. Korobkin, “Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited” (2000) 79 Or. L. Rev. 23; Neil MacCormick, “Reconstruction after Deconstruction: A Response to CLS” (1990) 10 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 539 at 545; Frederick
Schauer, “The Convergence of Rules and Standards” (2003) N.Z.L. Rev. 303 at 305; Ian
Ayres, “Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules” (1993) 3 S.
Cal. Interdisciplinary L.J. 1 at 18.

25

See Written Submissions (2008), online: Expert Panel on Securities Regulation
<http://www.expertpanel.ca >.
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sume that principles-based and rules-based regulation were at opposite
extremes, and that a move to a more principles-based system meant substantially eliminating rules, no matter how efficient or necessary they
might be. Several stakeholders argued forcefully against exclusively principles-based or rules-based approaches, even though no such drastic move
was being proposed.

A. A Time for Principles, A Time for Rules
Almost three decades ago, Colin Diver discussed what he called the
“optimal precision” of administrative rules—meaning, the degree of specificity in statutory or regulatory drafting that would best avoid the worst
problems of either imprecision or rigidity.26 He identified three elements
of regulatory precision: transparency (i.e., the words chosen have welldefined and universally-accepted meanings within the relevant community), accessibility (i.e., the law can be applied to concrete situations without excessive difficulty), and congruence (i.e., the substantive content
communicated by the words produces the desired behaviour). Not surprisingly, Diver found that no single “sweet spot” of precision exists. On
some questions, flexibility and sensitivity to a particular context will be
more important than certainty or the need to limit discretion. More general, principles-based drafting would make sense in that context. Elsewhere, a different mix would be called for. Diver also pointed out that
these qualities are difficult to measure, and there are often direct tradeoffs between them. Therefore, settling upon a particular mix between
rules and principles requires that choices be made, and public priorities
be established.
In particular, where these lines are drawn depends on public priorities
that the legislator has the mandate to establish. For example, a legislator
that is concerned about regulatory overreach or lack of transparency in a
particular area would see to it that the regulator had very little discretion
(i.e., that expectations are cast as rules rather than principles and are enshrined in a statute) when it comes to such things as access to information, the handling of complaints, or accountability to Parliament. A legislator concerned about individual rights would limit discretion (i.e., would
craft rules not principles) regarding hearings, procedural fairness, and
participation or consultation rights. A legislator concerned about ensuring
that the regulator can keep up with fast-moving events would give that
regulator principles, not rules, to work with, and would devolve substan-

26

Colin Diver, “The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules” (1983) 93 Yale L.J. 65
[Diver]. Diver does not use the terms rules and principles, but his understanding of
precision maps neatly onto the theoretical rules-versus-principles scholarship discussed
in the previous section.
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tial decision making to the regulator’s rule-making power. A legislator
concerned about ensuring a high correlation between regulatory goals and
effective application to particular cases would ensure that the regulator
had the power to flesh out the content of principles on a rolling basis,
rather than trying to draft specific details in advance.
Important external considerations also come into play. For example,
how much scope does the legislator want to leave to the interpretation of
regulators, as well as potentially of courts or tribunals? Where does existing regulatory practice (whether principles-based or rules-based) seem to
be well-established, to be working well, and to have created expectations
on which stakeholders rely?27 Would a particular drafting approach foster
harmonization between existing regulatory regimes, or nudge regulatory
practice in a desirable new direction? Are some issues particularly important to the proper functioning of Canadian capital markets (i.e., regulating effectively the many small, closely held public companies, or addressing the rumoured Canadian “market discount”28), which call for welltailored and highly adaptive—that is, principles-based—solutions? On
what specific issues does the political will exist to move decisively away
from the status quo? What messages does Canada, through its regulatory
regime, want to send internationally? All of this requires that policymakers develop a set of criteria reflecting policy calculations for deciding
when to use rules and when to use principles.
Context also matters. An appropriate balance between rules and principles in securities regulation may look quite different from the appropriate balance in other regulatory arenas. The nature of the industry being
regulated, the roles of the various players in it, and the risks associated

27

See e.g. Lawrence A. Cunningham, “Principles and Rules in Public and Professional Securities Law Enforcement: A Comparative U.S. – Canadian Inquiry” in Task Force to
Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada: Canada Steps Up, vol. 6, online: Task
Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada ‹http://www.tfmsl.ca› 253 at 299
(finding that in their enforcement actions, the National Association of Securities Dealers and the IDA, now Financial Industry Regulatory Assocation (FINRA) and Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC), invoke certain principles
rather than existing rules).

28

For a discussion of the Canadian “market discount,” see e.g. The Hon. Peter de C. Cory,
C.C & Marilyn L. Pilkington, “Critical Issues in Enforcement” in Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada: Canada Steps Up, vol. 6, online: Task Force to
Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada ‹http://www.tfmsl.ca› 165; Utpal Bhattacharya, “Enforcement and its Impact on Cost of Equity and Liquidity of the Market” in
Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada: Canada Steps Up, vol. 6,
online: Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada ‹http://www.tfmsl.ca›
131; Crawford, supra note 11 at 12. For a review of some recent research challenging
the existence of the Canadian discount, see Cécile Carpentier, Jean-François L’Her &
Jean-Marc Suret, “On the Competitiveness of the Canadian Stock Market” (2009) 24
B.F.L.R. 287 at 300-303.
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with that area of conduct will inform the regulatory design process.29 It is
relevant that securities regulation is a disclosure-based system that relies
heavily on ensuring reasonable access to information as a means for protecting investors. This suggests that congruence is important in this context, so that core definitions of materiality and disclosure should be broad
and principles-based. Other areas where the over- or under-inclusiveness
of rules is particularly problematic, and where flexibility and congruence
are especially important, is preventing fraud and minimizing “cosmetic”
compliance and “loophole behaviour”. This is the rationale for broad statutory definitions of fraud, and commissions’ sweeping public interest powers.30 Financial markets are also complex, fast-moving environments
marked by constant product-level innovation. Principles recommend
themselves in this environment, when underpinned by effective information-gathering and analytical mechanisms,31 since detailed rules may only
add to complexity and opacity.32 Principles also make sense where a flexible approach is needed to ensure good corporate conduct—for example,
with regard to internal compliance processes, corporate culture, or risk
assessment by management.33 Like the deference accorded to securities
commissions under administrative law,34 principles-based regulation also

29

See also Black, “Making a Success”, supra note 1 at 200-201.

30

See Committee for the Equal Treatment of Asbestos Minority Shareholders v. Ontario
(Securities Commission), 2001 SCC 37, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 132 at para. 41, 199 D.L.R. (4th)
577 [Asbestos Minority Shareholders]; Anita Anand, “Carving the Public Interest Jurisdiction in Securities Regulation: Contributions of Justice Iacobucci” (2007) 57 U.T.L.J.
293. Even considering the substantial deference to securities commissions, courts (and
commissions themselves through their policies) should establish standards and explicit
rationales for the application of public interest powers to ensure that they are exercised
in a predictable way, as well as to ensure that those applying them consider relevant
factors, do not consider inappropriate factors, and behave fairly.

31

See discussion in “Four Points on Regulatory Capacity” below.

32

See Steven L. Schwarcz, “Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets” (2009) 87
Wash. L. Rev. [Schwarcz, “Regulating Complexity”], citing Richard Bookstaber at note
118.

33

Edward Rubin, “The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse”
(2005) 103 Mich. L. Rev. 2073 (arguing for open-ended formulations where the regulator “knows the result it is trying to achieve but does not know the means for achieving
it, when circumstances are likely to change in ways that the [regulator] cannot predict,
or when the [regulator] does not even know the precise result that she desires” at 2131);
see also Ford, “New Governance”, supra note 1. Colin Diver has suggested that the registration of persons should fall at the more principles-based end of the spectrum, because registration and licensure do not deter or influence conduct and try to make predictions about future conduct about which little can be known at the time of licensing
(supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 79).

34

See Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557 at 596,
114 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 7 W.W.R. 1 [Pezim cited to S.C.R.]; Asbestos Minority Shareholders, supra note 30 at para. 49.
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reflects legislative faith in regulatory expertise, objectivity, fairness, and
capacity.
One can also identify situations where rules may make particular
sense in securities regulation. Consistency in form is important in disclosure documents, for example, to make it easier for potential investors to
compare investments.35 Prospectus requirements should therefore contain
detailed form requirements. Securities commissions are also powerful
administrative agencies, with broad mandates and the ability to impose
heavy sanctions. For rule of law reasons, process requirements associated
with investigatory powers and enforcement conduct should be clearly set
out. Provisions around notice, rights to hearings, time limits, and procedural fairness should presumptively be more rules-based. Rules also make
sense where the sheer cost of applying a principle outweighs the principle’s flexibility benefits—for example, where the regulator needs to manage large numbers of relatively small matters.36 Accessibility is also important if lay individuals will be interpreting the law on their own. This is
a concern in capital markets like Canada, within which many small actors
with limited compliance resources operate.37 During a transitional stage
between rules-based and principles-based regulation, for example, maintaining legacy rules may help keep compliance costs down. Finally, rules
may be appropriate in situations where the regulator or statutory drafter
is confident that it can devise an easy to describe, easy to verify, and fairly
stable rule-based requirement that will serve as an effective proxy for a
broader regulatory goal, such as ensuring good corporate conduct.38

35

As technology improves, for example through the mandated use of Extensible Business
Reporting Language (XBRL), consistency in form may be seen as less important than
ensuring the most effective possible disclosure. See “An Introduction to XBRL”, online:
XBRL International <http://www.xbrl.org>.

36

Kaplow, supra note 16. Kaplow also argues that the determining factor should be the
frequency of regulated action. Where frequency is low, standards are preferable; where
frequency is high, the costs of promulgating rules are justifiable (ibid. at 621). Trading
rules are a good example of a rules-based treatment of high-frequency events.

37

See generally Christopher Nicholls, “The Characteristics of Canada’s Capital Markets
and the Illustrative Case of Canada’s Legislative Regulatory Response to SarbanesOxley” in Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada: Canada Steps Up,
vol. 4, online: Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada
<http://www.tfmsl.ca> 127. After the transitional stage, principles may prove much easier to implement than rules for smaller actors. Nicholls suggests that the small size of
Canadian small-cap and micro-cap companies implies a more flexible regime, rather
than a more rules-bound one (ibid. at 162).

38

Clayton P. Gillette, “Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment Systems” (1996) 82
Va. L. Rev. 181 (“Precise directives are more appropriate when we have the greatest
confidence in our capacity to inform target actors (those at whom legal directives are
aimed), to describe antisocial forms of behavior (so that target actors know the scope of
permitted and prohibited activity), and to recognize the occurrence of such behavior (for
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B. Actual Principles-Based Securities Regulation: Key Characteristics
In producing a research report on principles-based regulation for the
Expert Panel,39 I reviewed and compared (1) the Ontario Securities Act;40
(2) Bill 38, the proposed British Columbia Securities Act, and associated
proposed securities rules (collectively, the “B.C. Model”);41 (3) the Quebec
Derivatives Act;42 (4) the United Kingdom Financial Services and Markets
Act;43 and (5) the United States Commodity Futures Modernization Act44
with a view to determining how principles-based regulation differed from
more rules-based regulation at the level of statutory drafting.45 The OSA
was chosen to represent the legislative status quo across Canada. The
Quebec statute and the B.C. Model are generally understood to be more
principles-based. The FSMA was not explicitly principles-based when it
was drafted, but the FSA adapted its statutory mandate to develop a
world-leading model of principles-based regulation.46
Without claiming to be comprehensive, the report identified some
overarching themes at the level of statutory drafting.47 There were several
commonalities across regulatory schemes, regardless of whether the repurposes of enforcement). Uncertainty about any of these factors warrants the use of
less precise formulations” at 185).
39

See Ford, “Securities Regulation”, supra note 12.

40

Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 [OSA].

41

Bill 38, Securities Act, 5th Sess., 37th Leg., British Columbia, 2004 (assented to 13 May
2004), S.B.C. 2004, c. 43, s. 203 [Bill 38]; “Securities Rules (proposed)” (21 June 2004) at
Rules 93-104, 114-16, online: British Columbia Securities Commission
<http://www.bcsc.bc.ca > [“Securities Rules”].

42

QDA, supra note 14.

43

Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (U.K.), 2000, c. 8 [FSMA].

44

Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, 7 U.S.C. §1 (2000) [CFMA].

45

The report also occasionally considered the in-force B.C. Securities Act.

46

See Julia Black, “Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation” (2008), online:
<http://www.scribd.com> at 12 [Black, “Forms and Paradoxes”] (distinguishing among
the following: “formal PBR”, meaning principles in the rule books; “substantive PBR”,
which has some of the operational elements of PBR but not principles on the rule books;
“full PBR”, exhibiting both principles in the rule books and a principles-based operational approach; and “polycentric PBR”, which is full PBR with the additional element
of incorporationg third parties into the regulatory process).

47

Note that the report compared statutes only. A comprehensive comparison of these
regulatory regimes is neither feasible nor very helpful, given the number of different
factors that go into the drafting of any statute. Just as importantly, national and multilateral instruments, regulations, and rules play central roles in real-life securities regulation. On this larger plane, this report concurs generally with Professor Stéphane
Rousseau’s description of which aspects of securities regulation are rule-based and
which are principles-based, as referred to in the Brief submitted by the Autorité des
marchés financiers to the Expert Panel on Securities Regulation. See Autorité des
marchés financiers, Single Regulator: A Needless Proposal , online: Autoritiés des
marchés financiers <http://www.lautorite.qc.ca > at 26-27.
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gime was more rules- or principles-based, and the draft securities act issued by the Expert Panel (based as it was on the existing Alberta Securities Act)48 reflects the same choices. For example, disclosure and fraud
provisions tend to be drafted in a more principles-based manner because
these are areas where congruence is essential (i.e., the definition of fraud
must be able to capture even novel forms of fraudulent behaviour) and
loophole behaviour cannot be tolerated. Compliance provisions—which
require registrants to maintain effective systems and controls to manage
the risks associated with their businesses, and prevent and detect internal wrongdoing—also tend to be principles-based.49 More detailed rules
cover topic areas where power is uneven and transparency is not otherwise ensured, or where fairness and basic administrative law underpinnings are at stake. For example, every securities scheme has provisions
that govern administrative proceedings such as hearings and investigations, and they are all substantially process based and rule oriented.50 The
statutes are less detailed around areas that change quickly or that require specialized expertise. In general, these overarching commonalities
accord with the Diver analysis as to where transparency, flexibility, or
congruence should be the dominant concerns.
The Expert Panel research report also identified particular ways in
which more principles-based and rules-based regimes differ. Some differences are essentially stylistic. For example, principles-based regulation is
consistent with a move toward plain language drafting.51 Other differences, while consistent with a principles-based regulatory philosophy, are
not essential to it. In particular, the proposed B.C. legislation originally
imagined much more streamlined processes in its proposals for firm-only
registration and continuous market access.52 Another element common to
48

See “Draft Securities Act”, supra note 15 at 3; Securities Act, R.S.A. 2000, C. S-4.

49

But see QDA, supra note 14, cls. 26-31, 61-62. See also the compliance provisions in
Registration Requirements and Exemptions, B.C.S.C. NI 31-103 (advanced notice, effective 28 September 2009) at Part 11 [NI31-103], online: British Columbia Securities
Commission <http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/>.

50

The best examples here are OSA, supra note 40, ss. 3.5, 8-9; and Bill 38, supra note 40,
cls. 65, 70(2)-(3), 75. The FSMA and QDA do not contain direct analogues. Because the
FSMA establishes an independent oversight body, the Financial Services and Markets
Tribunal, it treats administrative proceedings somewhat differently. However, the
process-based and rule-driven structure persists. See e.g. FSMA, supra note 43, s. 13.
The QDA is a more circumscribed statute that borrows many provisions from the Quebec Securities Act, though it contains some process-based provisions at ss. 115-17.

51
52

See Bill 38, supra note 41. Section [...] would have replaced existing prospectus disclosure rules, short form prospectus provisions, the entire exempt market transaction
structure, and existing continuous disclosure obligations, as they then were, with an
overarching “Continuous Market Access” structure. Continuous Market Access would
have required all companies accessing the British Columbia capital markets simply to
disclose all “material information” (here, replacing “material fact” and “material
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the principles-based statutes considered is the inclusion of a small number of high-level principles guiding the conduct of regulated entities.53
Consistent with the principles-based approach, how exactly those principles translate into specific business-conduct expectations in context is left
to be filled in through techniques such as administrative guidance, enforcement example, the incorporation and dissemination of good or best
practices, and ongoing communication between regulator and registrant.54
The most profound structural differences between the more principlesbased and more rules-based statutes are found in two areas: (1) the proportion of decision making and interpretive power that is explicitly left to
be filled in through the rule-making function, rather than statutory drafting; and (2) the proportion of outcome-oriented versus process-oriented
statutory requirements.
All four statutes studied grant rule-making power to the regulator in
question.55 To be clear, securities law statutes in every jurisdiction contain
notable principles-based provisions.56 By contrast to regulators in other
fields, securities regulators already have extensive notice-and-comment
rule-making powers and enjoy substantial deference from courts on judicial review.57 As between the more rules-based and principles-based systems, however, the difference lies in how much detail is provided in the
statute, and how much is left to be filled in through the Authority’s or
Commission’s rule making. The difference between a traditional, more
rules-based approach to statutory drafting and the B.C. version of more
principles-based drafting is strikingly illustrated in the Table of Concor-

change”) on a real-time basis. Other B.C. model innovations included firm-only registration (which was abandoned before the project as a whole was abandoned), secondary
market liability (which was later resurrected), and enhanced enforcement powers.
53

The FSA refers to its set of principles as the “Principles for Business” (Principles for
Business, online: Financial Services Authority ‹http://www.fsa.gov.uk ›); British Columbia’s Bill 38 would have contained a “Code of Conduct for Dealers and Advisors”; and,
the CFMA (supra note 44) and QDA (QDA, supra note 14 ) both refer to theirs as “Core
Principles for Derivative Markets.” Many of the principles contained in B.C.’s Code of
Conduct have since found their way into NI 31-103 (supra note 49), though that instrument also contains detailed rules.

54

For a more detailed description of these techniques and their use in ascribing content to
regulatory principles, see Ford, “Securities Regulation”, supra note 12 at 9-13.

55

See OSA, supra note 40, s. 143; Bill 38, supra note 41, s. 170; QDA, supra note 14, ss.
174-75; FSMA, supra note 43, s. 138. Rule making needs to be distinguished not only
from statutes, but also from regulations, which, though subordinate, must go through
the legislative process rather than being largely or entirely under the control of the
regulator itself.

56

See e.g. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C §78j (2000), and Rule 10b-5-1, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009) promulgated thereunder.

57

See Pezim, supra note 34; Asbestos Minority Shareholders, supra note 30.
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dance prepared by BCSC staff in September 2004.58 Large chunks of the
Securities Act currently in force simply have no equivalent in the proposed
B.C legislation, in large part because the proposed legislation allocates
the authority over more context-specific, detailed decision making to the
Commission, pursuant to its rulemaking power.59
Consider, for example, Canadian prospectus requirements. Both Ontario and British Columbia (under both the existing Act and the proposed
legislation) require that issuers file a prospectus and obtain a receipt for it
before distributing or offering a security. The statutes’ overarching provisions are quite similar:60

58

See Table of Concordance: Securities Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 418 to Securities Act, S.B.C.
2004, c. 43 (not in force), online: British Columbia Securities Commission
<http://www.bcsc.bc.ca>.

59

See Securities Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.418 [BCSA]. The other important factor was substantive reform under the proposed B.C. Model, including especially its Continuous
Market Access approach (Bill 38, supra note 53).

60

Bill 38, supra note 41, ss. 18(1)-18(2); BCSA, supra note 60, ss. 61(1)-61(2); OSA, supra
note 40, s. 53(1).
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Bill 38 (the proposed B.C. legislation)

18 (1) A person must not make an offering of a security unless a prospectus for the security has
been filed and the commission has issued a
receipt for the prospectus.
(2) A prospectus filed under subsection (1) must
be in the required form.

B.C. Securities Act,
R.S.B.C. 1996 (in
force)

61 (1) Unless exempted under this Act or the regulations, a person must not distribute a security unless a preliminary prospectus and a
prospectus respecting the security
(a)

have been filed with the executive director, and

(b)

receipts obtained for them from the executive director.

(2) A preliminary prospectus and a prospectus
must be in the required form.

Ontario
Act

Securities

53 (1) No person or company shall trade in a security on his, her or its own account or on behalf
of any other person or company where such
trade would be a distribution of such security,
unless a preliminary prospectus and a prospectus have been filed and receipts therefor
obtained from the Director.

Where the more rules based and principles based approaches diverge,
however, is in the additional detail provided in the statute itself. In the
OSA and the existing BCSA, the general requirement above is accompanied by additional provisions concerning, inter alia, amendments to preliminary and final prospectuses (each of which receives distinct treatment), certification requirements for issuers, directors, officers, underwriters, etc., receipts, waiting periods, and distribution.61 By contrast, the

61

See OSA, supra note 40, ss. 57 (prospectus amendments), 58 (certificate by issuer), 59
(certificate underwriter), 61 (prospectus receipt), 65 (waiting period), Part XVI (distribution); BCSA, supra note 58, as at 2004, ss. 66 [repealed] (preliminary prospectus
amendment), 67 [repealed] (prospectus amendment), 68 [repealed] (certificate of issuer),
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proposed B.C. legislation locates many of those issues within its proposed
Securities Rules, instead of the proposed statute.62 A similar shift toward
greater reliance on Commission rule making powers is evident in the proposed B.C. legislation around takeover and issuer bids, proxies, continuous disclosure, and primary market civil liability.63
The second major distinguishing feature of more principles-based legislation is that it tends to be structured in a more outcome-oriented, as
opposed to process-oriented, manner. The notion of outcome-oriented
regulation is so connected to the principles-based approach that in its
submission to the Expert Panel, the BCSC expressed a preference for the
term “outcomes-based” rather than “principles-based” to describe its approach.64 Outcome-oriented regulation measures performance against
regulatory goals, whereas process-based regulation measures compliance
with detailed procedural requirements.65 For example, both the OSA and
69 [repealed] (certificate of underwriter), 65 (prospectus receipt), 78 (waiting period),
Part XI (distribution).
62

See especially “Securities Rules”, supra note 41 at Rules 93-104, 114-16.

63

One of the wrinkles concerns where each principles-based regime locates its “core principles” (see Ford, “Securities Regulation”, supra note 12 at 60-65). British Columbia and
the FSA issued their Code/Principles through rule making, while the CFMA (supra
note 44), and the QDA (supra note 14) chose to embed them directly into legislation. It
seems that nothing substantive turns on the choice.

64

Submission BCSC, supra note 13 at 4. See also Business Plan: 2009/10, online: Financial Services Authority <http://www.fsa.gov.uk > at 9. These regulators prefer the terms
“outcomes-oriented” or “outcomes-focused” primarily due to confusion around the term
“principles-based”, and not because they see the terms as interchangeable. Principlesbased and outcome-oriented regulation are different concepts and should not be conflated; for example, one could have a system that is rule-based and outcome-oriented.
However, principles-based and outcome-oriented regulation share philosophical convictions about the purposes of regulation and the most effective means for achieving regulatory goals.
Secondary market civil liability was not part of the existing BCSA in 2004, when
the proposed legislation was drafted, so we cannot compare the structure there. Note,
also, that the principles-based regimes diverge in terms of where they locate their “core
principles” (see Ford, “Securities Regulation”, supra note 12, at 60-65). British Columbia and the FSA issued their Code/Principles through rule making, while the CFMA
(supra note 44), and the QDA (supra note 14) chose to embed them directly into legislation. All of these Codes/Principles are actually pitched at similar levels of precision—
i.e., they are all cast in terms of high level principles. There is no intention that they
should be regularly amended based on regulatory experience. Therefore purely in
terms of regulatory design they should probably be part of the statute rather than the
rules, although there may have been practical considerations at play as well. It seems
that nothing substantive turns on the choice.

65

In actual practice, there is no necessary disconnect between outcome-oriented regulation and a third approach that some scholars call management-based regulation. See
Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, “Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private
Management to Achieve Public Goals” (2003) 37 Law & Soc'y Rev. 691. There are differences between the two concepts regarding the stage of firm conduct at which the
regulator intervenes, but both place responsibility for detailed decision making with in-
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one part of the B.C. Model, its Code of Conduct for dealers and advisers66
contain provisions that try to ensure that customers receive timely disclosure of trades conducted on their account. However, the OSA establishes
a strict procedure whereas the B.C. Code of Conduct only specifies an outcome.67 We see similar differences in their approaches to dealer conflicts
of interest.68
Another example is account supervision by broker-dealer firms. In
2004, the BCSC commissioned a regulatory impact analysis that compared the detailed, process-based account supervision requirements established by the Investment Dealers Association (IDA), as it then was, with
the more outcome-oriented requirements imagined under the proposed
B.C. Code of Conduct for dealers and advisers.69 The Code of Conduct
would have required a firm to “[m]aintain an effective system to ensure
compliance with this Code, all applicable regulatory and other legal requirements, and [its] own internal policies and procedures,” and to
“[m]aintain an effective system to manage the risks associated with [its]
business.”70 The four firms studied were of the view that the IDA rules,71
which mandated transaction-based daily and monthly reviews, contributed significantly to their regulatory burden without providing meaningful investor protection. From their perspective, the reviews were duplicative, rigid—and, worst of all—not effective in detecting abuses characterized by patterns of behavior, which is where they thought the biggest
compliance risks arose. As a result of these perceived limitations and in
response to what the firms described as concerns about civil liability,
reputation, and good business practice, each of the firms had already, by
the time of the study, developed its own parallel risk-based supervisory

dustry actors and give those actors the flexibility to design mechanisms that work for
them based on their greater knowledge about their own businesses.
66

Code of Conduct, being Schedule of the Securities Rules, supra note 40 [Code of Conduct]. See also Securities Regulation in British Columbia: Guide for Dealers and Advisers, online: British Columbia Securities Commission <http://www.bcsc.bc.ca> at 32
[Guide for Dealers].

67

See OSA, supra note 40, s. 36; Christina Wolf, Strong and Efficient Investor Protection:
Dealers and Advisers under the BC Model— A Regulatory Impact Analysis (24 November 2003), online: British Columbia Securities Commission ‹http://www.bcsc.bc.ca› at 72
(Principle 8).

68

Compare OSA, supra note 64, s. 39 and Wolf, supra note 65 at 66 (Principle 6).

69

Wolf, supra note 65 at 48-57. Of course, primary responsibility for overseeing dealers
and advisors is subdelegated to self-regulatory organiztions (SRO) – most prominently
IIROC and the Mutal Fund Dealers Association of Canada. Those SROs would have to
be active participants in any change to a more principles-based approach.

70

See Code of Conduct, supra note 64, Principle 19. See also Guide, supra note 64 at 3132.

71

See generally, Guide for Dealers, supra note 64 at 13-15, 17.
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system.72 The regulatory impact analysis concluded that relative to the existing system, B.C.’s proposed Code of Conduct would, by permitting firms
to focus their energies on their effective internal risk-management systems, improve investor protection, allow firms to innovate to achieve regulatory objectives in the ways that were most efficient for their businesses,
and reduce compliance costs.
We return to some of the difficulties associated with reliance on internal risk models below.73 The point here is that outcome orientation has
important implications for the approach to regulation. By definition, outcome-oriented regulation accepts that there may be more than one means
(i.e., more than one process) to achieve a regulatory goal. It transfers decision making about process from regulators to industry. The essential assumption underlying both principles-based and outcome-oriented regulation is that legislators and regulators are in the best position to develop
regulatory goals, but may not be in the best position to devise processbased means for achieving those goals. One of the reasons that outcomeoriented regulation is attractive is that it establishes a more direct relationship between regulatory goals and regulatory requirements. Outcome-oriented regulation translates regulatory goals directly and transparently into the outcomes that industry is required to meet. By contrast,
process-oriented requirements that are developed by regulators in advance, even though regulators possess less contextual information than
industry actors, may not be perfectly tailored to regulatory goals. Processoriented regulation can also permit market participants to abide by the
letter of the law while ignoring its spirit. This is especially the case when
it comes to highly complex instruments, or in areas where events are fastmoving and regulators on their own could not hope to keep up with the
pace of innovation.
Fundamental to an outcome-oriented system is the existence or development of an “interpretive community”74 that collectively develops, on a
rolling basis, the detailed content of statutory principles. In order to function transparently and predictably, a principles-based system must build
in mechanisms that allow regulators to communicate with industry about

72

For an example of the limitations that the firms found frustrating, see generally ibid. at
14-17.

73

Reliance on internal risk-management analysis in the context of Basel II and the Consolidated Supervised Entities Program at the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission are discussed in “The Global Financial Crisis,” below.

74

Stanley Fish, Is There A Text in This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980); Julia Black, Rules and Regulators
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) at 30-37 [Black, Rules and Regulators]; Julia Black,
“Talking about Regulation” (1998) Public Law 77; Sol Picciotto, “Constructing Compliance: Game Playing, Tax Law, and the Regulatory State” (2007) 29 Law & Pol’y 11;
Capital Markets, supra note 2.
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their expectations, and that both allow and require industry to speak
openly and regularly with regulators about their processes. Communication can take place through a number of channels including official administrative guidance, speeches, “no action” or “Dear CEO” letters, compliance audits, comments on industry standards, or specific enforcement
actions. Over time, such communication can help develop an interpretive
community that understands regulatory expectations, and can usefully interpret regulatory pronouncements about “reasonableness” or “effectiveness” in different situations.
Principles-based securities regulation is thus a particular way of
structuring regulation, not a decision to do away with rules. Principlesbased regulation is based on the conviction that while legislators and
statutory drafters have the public legitimacy to establish broad regulatory
goals, they are not in the best position to develop detailed guidelines for
industry conduct, especially in fast-moving arenas like securities regulation. Those powers are allocated to frontline regulators at the securities
commissions, whose expertise derives from their proximity to industry
and whose accountability derives from the notice-and-comment aspect of
their rulemaking powers. Moreover—and this is the crucial point today—
even those front line regulators are limited in their access to information
by comparison to the industries they regulate. In order to remain relevant
and informed about fast-moving industry practice, to keep regulation sufficiently flexible, and to avoid inhibiting productive innovation, regulators
need to establish open and perpetual communication lines with industry.
They need to use industry’s own good and best practices to add the “meat”
of detail to the “bones” of their principles-based regulatory expectations.
Described another way, principles-based regulation is a two-tiered approach, in which principles-based legislative drafting provides flexibility,
to which constantly evolving industry experience and regulatory rules add
certainty on a rolling basis. In this formulation principles-based regulation, as applied, avoids the biggest problems associated with both principles and rules, at the level of theory. Moreover, it can produce more effective regulation by ensuring that the party that has access to the best information is the one that provides the detail on any particular issue.”
What the GFC may suggest to us is that this “beyond theory” perspective
is still idealized, and that its promise was not achieved in practice. How
real-life experience fell short of expectations is described in the next part,
followed by a discussion of three large lessons learned.

II. The Global Financial Crisis
At least three major arguments contend that the GFC does not represent even a superficial challenge to principles-based securities regulation.
First, the most alarming problems originated with complex securitized
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products that were distributed through exempt private-market placements, entirely bypassing the public securities markets where the full
panoply of regulatory safeguards would have applied. Second, the GFC
has far more to do with gaps in regulation than with drafting choices.
Gaps in regulation, especially around prudential regulation of players in
the so-called “shadow banking system” in the United States, were surely
the most obvious and consequential aspect of regulatory failure.75 The asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) crisis in Canada in August 2007 revolved around paper sold under an exemption from securities regulation.76
Credit-rating agencies, which utterly failed as gatekeepers,77 were drastically under-regulated.78 Third, the GFC was a global event. The complex
securitization technology that increased risky lending, decreased transparency, and multiplied and spread risk79 was not unique to principlesbased jurisdictions. Even within the core concerns of securities regulation,
national systems traditionally described as rules-based—specifically, that
of the United States—demonstrably fared no better than the more principles-based system at the United Kingdom’s FSA. While many specific
components of financial and securities regulation, ranging from prudential regulation and systemic risk analysis to the basic usefulness of the ex-
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See Department of the Treasury, Financial Regulatory Reform, supra note 7; Patricia
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Observers have also pointed out that the SEC, which had primary oversight of most
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79

See e.g. McCoy, Pavlov & Wachter, supra note 75.

24

(2010) 55 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL

isting disclosure-based model80 are legitimately being re-examined, they
are being re-examined globally.

A. Risk and Reward: Devolution of Details to Industry
Where the GFC should provoke reflection, however, is with regard to
the role of devolution to industry. Here, the GFC does represent a challenge (though I would argue not a fundamental one) to principles-based
regulation. Principles-based regulation works by devolving the details of
regulation to industry, on the assumption that industry has the best information and is in the best position to both assess and bear its own risks.
While not essential to principles-based regulation, this devolution is a
central reason for the advantage of principles-based regulation over rulesbased regulation in fast-moving environments. Devolution of the details to
industry, however, went on to play a central role in enabling some of the
most painfully aggravating conditions associated with the U.S. subprime
mortgage meltdown. This need not have been the case. Crucially, devolution does not automatically imply weak public oversight. Nevertheless,
devolution accompanied by an ideology of self-regulation contributed to
insufficient oversight of the massive expansion of the over-the-counter
market for derivatives within which credit default swaps (CDS) traded,
following the passage of the CFMA.81 Other examples of devolution included Basel II82 and, correspondingly, the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission’s (SEC) approval in 2004 of alternative net capital
requirements for the leading investment banks under the Consolidated
Supervised Entities Program (CSE Program).83 These initiatives allowed
banks and investment banks to maintain capital reserves based on their
own internal risk-assessment models, with very little scrutiny from regulators.
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Steven L. Schwarcz, “Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis” (2008)
Utah L. Rev. 1109.
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See Stephen Labaton & Timothy L. O’Brien, “Financiers Plan to Put Controls on Derivatives” The New York Times (7 January 1999) C1 (discussing the move towards selfregulation in derivative markets, prior to the GFC); Testimony of Christopher Cox,
“Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Recent Actions Regarding Government Sposored Entities, Investment Banks and Other Financial Institutions ” (23 September 2008) ,
online: Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
<http://www.sec.gov> (recognizing a lack of regulatory oversight in the market for CDS
and other derivative products).
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International Settlements <http://www.bis.org>.
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Securities and Exchange Commmission, “Alternative Net Capital Requirements for
Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated Supervised Entities”, online: (2004) 69
Federal Register 118 ‹http://www.sec.gov›. See also Stephen Labaton, “Agency’s ’04 Rule
Let Banks Pile Up New Debt” The New York Times (3 October 2008) A1.
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Regulatory faith in industry actors’ competence, if not literally their
bona fides, proved to have been misplaced to catastrophic effect. George
Soros has charged that the GFC reflects a “shocking abdication of responsibility” on the part of regulators.84 Investment banks and others engaged
in originating, structuring, and selling financial products engaged in
breathtakingly bad behaviour. There was real dishonesty.85 The firms also
made grave errors in safeguarding even their own interests. In the hands
of in-house financial economists, academic caveats about the limitations of
efficient markets theory (EMT) models86 as well as limits of valuation
models were ploughed under.87 Predictable psychological irrationalities
seem to have been at work within firms, including groupthink, overconfidence, self-serving biases, and excessive faith in “hard” numbers, which
were not accounted for in the regulatory decision to devolve the details to
industry. There is also a strong public-choice narrative: banks had little
incentive to behave prudently in building tranches of consumer debtbased securities because they sold them to third parties, in a market eager to buy them.88 At a structural level, banks may have focused on shortterm gain at the expense of long-term value because they were public corporations, not partnerships, and because bank CEOs were compensated
based on short-term earnings.89
Regulators also seem to have underestimated the degree to which industry actors would try to avoid or circumvent regulatory oversight.
Whether out of short-term self-interest, economic pressure, or simple lack
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2009), online: Wired <http://www.wired.com> (describing oversimplification of Li’s
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of understanding,90 firms within the CSE Program that applied the alternative net capital requirements valued illiquid assets too generously, underestimated long-tail risks, and maintained inadequate capital buffers,
all the while arguing that their behaviour was reducing rather than exacerbating risk. Firms innovated in structured products, not only to reflect
increasing sophistication or in order to make their product more attractive to purchasers, but also sometimes to avoid regulation.91 They avoided
comparability in order to reduce transparency and make it harder for
regulators to understand what they were selling.92
Each of these factors, even in isolation, represents a considerable challenge to what Julia Black has termed the “regulatory Utopia”, within
which the self-examining, responsible firm, possessing the greatest contextual information, helps to elaborate the content of principles-based
regulation through ongoing dialogue with a flexible and outcome-oriented
regulator, in the service of the mutual goal of optimized regulation.93
What follows below is a dissection of the ways in which the self-regulatory
regimes that gained so much traction in the past decade differ from principles-based regulation when buttressed by an active regulatory presence.
Only after we have a sense of the underlying structure of the principlesbased project can we assess what it slipped to in recent practice, and what
aspects of it remain vital.
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B. Enforced Self-Regulation and Principles-Based Regulation
Principles-based regulation is not the same thing as self-regulation.
Nevertheless, the distinction between principles-based regulation and
self-regulation has not always been adequately emphasized. Competition
between jurisdictions for increasingly mobile global capital played a role
in obscuring the distinction. Large financial firms’ ability to relocate to
more “competitive” regulatory environments provoked regulators and policy makers to focus on the costs of substantive regulation. The rhetoric of
principles-based regulation became enmeshed with the rhetoric of efficiency and the need to control the regulatory burden. Arguments in favour of principles-based regulation from Henry Paulsen, for example,
tended to emphasize the free-market benefits and reduced regulatory
burden associated with the FSA approach—not its asserted regulatory
oversight benefits.94 Some, concerned about London’s increased capital
market share in the last few years, asserted that its success with principles-based approach was the result of lower standards and lax oversight
under principles-based regulation, especially in its junior market.95 London-based regulators naturally disputed this assessment.96
The March 2009 Turner Review insightfully describes the regulatory
worldview that failed to anticipate the problems identified above.97 Lord
Adair Turner, now FSA Chairman, was commissioned by the Chancellor
of the Exchequer in October 2008 to review the causes of the financial crisis and make recommendations about regulatory changes. According the
Turner Review, the FSA did not fail because it embraced principles-based
regulation. Indeed, principles-based regulation is barely mentioned.98 In94
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<http://www.abanet.org > at 13 (blaming the heavy regulatory burden in the United
States for the shift in business to London).

95

See John Gapper, “Thain lambasts Aim standards,” Financial Times (26 January 2007)
online:
Financial
Times
<http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto012620071731342399>.

96

See e.g., Clara Furse, “Sox is not to blame - London is just better as a market” Financial
Times (U.K.) (19 September 2006); John Tiner, “Better Regulation: Objective or Oxymoron” (Speech delivered at the SII Annual Conference, 9 May 2006), online: Financial
Services
Authority
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2006/0509_jt.shtml>.

97

Turner, supra note 5.

98

Notwithstanding premature and ultimately inaccurate reports by credible U.K. media
sources that principles-based regulation would be abandoned. See Peter Thal Larsen &
Jennifer Hughes, “Sants Takes a Fresh View of Regulator’s Principles,” Financial
Times (13 March 2009), online: FT.com <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6ecc49d0-0f70-11deba10-0000779fd2ac.html>.

28

(2010) 55 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL

stead, Lord Turner ascribes blame to flaws in FSA philosophy—that is, to
a hands-off, market-based regulatory approach that assumed: markets
were generally self-correcting; market discipline could be trusted to contain risk; primary responsibility for managing risk lay with senior management not regulators, because senior management has better information; and consumers were best protected through unfettered and transparent markets, not product regulation or direct intervention.99
Lord Turner is correct to draw a distinction between the FSA’s stance
in favour of industry self-regulation and its principles-based approach. To
equate principles-based regulation unequivocally with self-regulation
would be to misunderstand both. The two are not inconsistent, nor are
they synonymous. Self-regulation refers to the degree of public intervention in private industry. Neither principles-based nor rules-based regulation guarantees any particular stance toward self-regulation. Principlesbased regulation is a particular regulatory approach that may or may not
be highly interventionist, depending on how it is implemented, even
though its effectiveness relies on pulling industry’s own experience and
information into regulatory expectations. Indeed, some opponents to principles-based regulation are primarily concerned about the possibility that
such an approach would allow regulators to overreach, especially in the
enforcement context.100 Whether a principles-based approach amounts to
lax regulation, overzealous regulation, or (impossibly) pitch-perfect regulation is a function of how, and how well, it is implemented.
Principles-based regulation as properly understood inevitably requires
a robust and capable public role, including meaningful enforcement.101
Principles-based regulation is not code for a position that promotes allowing industry to do an end run around the regulator. It is a conceptually
consistent outgrowth of the loose group of regulatory perspectives variously known as new governance,102 co-regulation,103 enforced self99
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5 at 52.

100

See e.g. Briefing from Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (February 2007) “FSA Principles-Based Regulation: What Should Firms Be Doing Differently?”, online: Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer <http://www.freshfields.com> at 2.
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regulation,104 or “responsive regulation”.105 New governance and its variants are not the same as self-regulation.106 According to its proponents,
new governance scholarship exists explicitly for the purpose of making the
public state more, not less, central and relevant.107 To use Jerry Mashaw’s
recent formulation, new governance represents a different balance between the available public, market, and social mechanisms for ensuring

counting Principles (GAAP) rules were too rules-based. However, some scholars would
argue that new governance methods transcend the rules-versus-principles debate. See
Kathleen G. Noonan, Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, “Legal Accountability in
the Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons from Child Welfare Reform,” (2009) 34 Law &
Soc. Inquiry 523 (arguing that new governance, or “experimentalist”, practice resolves
“the rules/standard antimony” debate through a “simultaneous emphasis on articulation and flexibility” at 536-37, 554-56). In spite of differences in terminology and emphasis, the fully articulated version of what I call principles-based regulation is not in
tension with what Noonan, Sabel and Simon describe. These authors find it most useful
to frame the phenomenon as a pragmatic, practical method that bypasses an unproductive theoretical conversation. I find it most useful to focus on principles-based regulation as a first-order decision that reflects an appreciation of the relative capacities of
legislative drafters, regulators, and industry actors. Nevertheless, my version of principles-based regulation calls for careful attention to implementation mechanisms that
pull detailed industry knowledge into the articulation of those principles, in a way that
is strongly similar to what Noonan, Sabel and Simon describe. See also Ford, “New
Governance”, supra note 2 at 30, n. 111.
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accountability, putting greater emphasis on the latter two.108 It imagines
a different role for the regulator than rules-based, command-and-control
regulation does. However, it does not suggest that public accountability,
in the form of state action, could could ever be ignored.
How exactly to best enforce self-regulatory models is a matter of some
debate. Different models exist. Ex post enforcement actions play a much
larger role in U.S. securities regulation than they do in the United Kingdom, which focuses more on ex ante supervision and compliance work.109
The impact of civil liability also needs to be considered.110 When it comes
to principles-based regulation, Black is probably correct when she writes
that “principles need enforcement to give them credibility but overenforcement can lead to their demise.”111 A growing body of scholarship
exists concerning how to make enforced self-regulatory systems effective
and credible using supervision, outcome-oriented problem solving, negotiated compliance, and firm penetration through compliance audits.112 Enforcement in a principles-based system (including referral for criminal
prosecution if necessary) likely works best as the culmination of a series
108
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of such interactions with an industry actor, ratcheted up through an enforcement pyramid approach.113 Once at the enforcement stage, especially
when dealing with cases based on violation of a principle alone, bringing
enforcement actions successfully calls for substantial confidence and fortitude on the part of regulators. Enforcement staffers must also be watchful
for potential procedural fairness concerns.114
The GFC represents an important lesson for some new governance
scholarship, which has not always been particularly interested.115 Indeed,
the shortfall between the promise of an inspiring theoretical model and its
application to real-life regulation makes the problem more, not less, important to solve. What was missing from many aspects of financial regulation, in retrospect, was meaningful accountability. The pressing questions
now are why pre-GFC systems did not incorporate adequate public accountability mechanisms, and how principles-based securities regulation
in Canada might avoid similar pitfalls. What follows are three recommendations for charting a path forward for principles-based regulation in
Canada in the wake of the GFC. These recommendations take as a starting point that principles-based regulation must be buttressed by meaningful regulatory oversight, and then they move beyond that to a closer review of what accountability demands. The recommendations focus on
problems of complexity and capacity, and the compromising effect that a
lack of diversity and independent mindedness can have on effective regulatory oversight.

III. Lessons Learned and Steps Forward
A. Four Points on Regulatory Capacity
It turns out, as if there were ever any doubt, that how principles are
implemented is at least as important as how legislation is drafted.116 As
observed earlier, certainty in a principles-based regulatory regime has
less to do with how a particular provision is drafted and more to do with
the development of an interpretive community that defines the content of
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that provision.117 What is required is a regulator that is capable of functioning as an independent and credible member within that interpretive
community—that is, a regulator that has a clear sense of its distinct role
as a voice on behalf of the public interest. Moreover, because so much interpretive discretion rests in the regulator’s hands, regulatory capacity,
training, judgment, and philosophy are critically important to effective
implementation. It is therefore crucial to think carefully about the structure through which principles will be translated into regulatory practice.
Working well with principles-based regulation requires considerable
changes to traditional regulatory culture. Moving to a new model would
take time and training.118 A principles-based regulator focuses on defining
broad themes, articulating them in a flexible and outcome-oriented way,
accepting input from industry, and managing incoming information effectively. This requires expertise, a more ongoing communicative relationship with industry, restraint in providing administrative guidance, and
the continued use of notice-and-comment rule-making where appropriate.119 Principles-based regulation relies on good and best practices
emerging from industry to help define the content of principles-based
regulatory requirements. Using good and best practices, which evolve, as
opposed to potentially static industry standards, allows regulatory expectations to evolve and remain flexible. It also builds-in a learning process
for both regulators (who are learning from industry about what works in
different contexts) and regulatees (who are learning from each other.)
This shift in emphasis does not, however, require that regulators “roll
over and play dead” in the face of industry demands.

1. Lesson One: Effective Regulatory Capacity Requires Adequate
Number of Staff
At the first and most fundamental level, regulatory capacity in this
new environment requires an adequate number of staff. As Black has
pointed out, principles-based regulation (like risk-based regulation) may
be more hands-off in its approach to the details, but this does not mean
that it requires fewer regulatory resources. Depending on choices about
implementation, principles-based regulation may actually require inten-
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sive interaction with firms, at least around certain issues or situations.120
Yet, as the Northern Rock debacle in the United Kingdom highlighted,
the FSA was far from adequately staffed.121 Its Major Retail Groups Division was reduced by some twenty staff between 2004 and 2008, notwithstanding the Division’s responsibility for substantial and complex FSA
priorities such as Basel and the Treating Customers Fairly initiative, in
addition to its core firm risk-assessment work.122

2. Lesson Two: Regulators Must Have Transparent and Reliable
Information about Industry
The example of the SEC’s CSE Program is even more striking.123 Its
Division of Trading and Markets had only seven staffers and no executive
director, yet since March 2007, it was charged with overseeing five otherwise unregulated major broker-dealer firms, which formed the backbone
of the American-based shadow banking industry, based on an alternative
capital adequacy method. One of the effects of understaffing was that
Trading and Markets staff had not completed any inspections of the Division’s subject firms in the eighteen months prior to the collapse of Bear
Stearns in September 2008.124 This lack of oversight would have been
problematic in any event, but it was even more catastrophic in an outcome-oriented system where so much of the detailed procedural design for
achieving regulatory goals was delegated to industry. As we all now know,
the firms’ models, which assessed largely illiquid assets operating both in
the absence of price discovery and of backstop prudential regulation,
proved woefully inadequate.
Second, regulators must have the ability to obtain transparent and reliable information about the industry actors they oversee. Even today,
there can be no disputing that industry actors have better and more up-
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to-date information on their operations than regulators could hope to obtain. The larger firms also have far superior resources. Yet these same actors have an interest in casting facts to their advantage, in making their
products look as attractive as possible, and in reducing regulatory oversight where possible. Again, as hard experience at the FSA and the SEC
demonstrates, simple information collection is a crucial first step. The
post-mortem account of regulatory failure in the Northern Rock case identified a number of instances in which the FSA failed to collect, or did not
have access to, the information necessary to accurately assess the risk
that bank posed. Supervisors were found not to have been “proactive in
ensuring there was a robust process allowing them a complete picture of
issues.”125 The post-mortem analysis of the CSE Program recorded similar
weaknesses. Among other things, the analysis identified instances in
which the CSE staff failed to adequately track material issues in regulated firms, approved changes to capital requirements before completing
full inspections, and failed to exchange information with other SEC divisions.126 In a system where information is power, such as in the regulation
of the sale of complex derivative instruments, a regulator without the
ability to obtain direct information effectively cedes the field to those it
regulates.
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FSA, Northern Rock, supra note 121 at 7. The findings of an internal audit into the
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Principles-based regulation in conditions of complexity requires that
regulators have and use robust investigatory powers where necessary,
and that they conduct regular and adequate compliance audits. Like staffing adequacy and information-gathering capability, effective compliance
mechanisms are even more central in a principles-based environment.
Compliance efforts give regulators access to essential, fine-grained information about particular firms, and promote regulatory credibility and engagement with industry. They are an important tool for developing and
communicating the precise content of principles-based requirements to
industry actors. As noted above, they are also part of a coordinated, multifaceted oversight approach for public companies and regulated entities,
based on a carefully designed “enforcement pyramid” approach that also
includes other supervisory strategies, as well as civil and criminal enforcement.127

3. Lesson Three: Regulators Must Independently Scrutinize Information
Third, regulators in a principles-based system must have the capacity
to independently scrutinize information.128 This requires considerable capacity in terms of information management systems. It also calls for
quantitative expertise and industry experience. The FSA’s responses to
Northern Rock, and its challenges in meeting them, may be instructive to
Canadian securities regulators as they contemplate moving toward more
principles-based regulation. The FSA plans to enhance its supervisory
teams through increased staff, better training, a mandatory minimum
number of staff per high-impact institution, and closer contact between
senior staff and the biggest firms. It also plans to improve the quality of
its staff, hiring risk specialists to support front-line supervision teams by
focusing on the complex models used by banks to gauge financial risk.129
127
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As one commentator observed, the regulator will now be pursuing “the
same PhD rocket scientists the banks are chasing. ... As Northern Rock
shows, it’s not just about evaluating the problems, but having the people
who can follow them up and forcefully make the case to the bank.”130
The need to hire “PhD rocket scientists” may seem peculiar, given that
flawed quantitative analysis by in-house bank economists so drastically
exacerbated the GFC in the first place.131 The fact that quantitative
analysis has been abused, misapplied, and overgeneralized in the past,
however, does not mean that banks will not use it in the future. In spite of
its theoretical limitations and the recent catastrophe, quantitative analysis continues to have substantial predictive value, and it will continue to
serve as a central tool for financial industry actors. Securitization has
brought too many benefits, and too much profit in good times, for modern
financial markets to eschew it in the future. Indeed, financial innovation
continues.132 A regulator that does not have the capacity to challenge
firms’ models will not have the capacity to engage in an important ongoing conversation.

4. Lesson Four: Regulators Must Have Healthy Skepticism about
Industry
Finally, in addition to having the numbers, the information, and the
analytical skills, regulatory staffers must have sufficient confidence in
their own judgment and a healthy degree of skepticism about industry.
This difficult problem is discussed further below.133

B. Complexity and Prophylactic Rules
One of the striking lessons of the GFC has been the impact of complexity on the financial markets, and the degree to which existing regulatory
structures failed to manage those effects. Steven Schwarcz even suggests,
plausibly, that complexity is the “greatest financial market challenge of
the future.”134 He first describes the complexity in the assets that underlie

business strategies and system-wide risks, more focus on technical competence of FSA
supervisors, more focus on the details of bank accounting, and greater willingness to
reach judgments about the overall risks that firms are running.
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modern structured financial products, which is overlayered with complexity in the design of the structured products themselves and exacerbated
by complexity in modern financial markets. He then examines how these
multiple complexities can lead to inappropriate lending standards, failures of disclosure, a lack of transparency and even comprehensibility,
and—perhaps most difficult to manage—the creation of a complex system
characterized by intricate causal relationships and a “tight coupling”
within credit markets, in which events tend to amplify each other and
move rapidly into crisis mode.135 Prior to the GFC, there was a general
failure by all concerned to appreciate the myriad interrelated ways in
which complexity can impair markets and financial regulation.
It is unrealistic to think that we can now unwind complexity from our
financial markets. Instead, we must develop a more comprehensive and
fine-grained understanding of how complexity manifests and for what
reasons. Schwarcz’s incisive analysis of the sources of complexity is a first
step. We should also be evaluating varieties of complexity in terms of
their costs and benefits, both to real economies and financial markets as a
whole and to various constituencies.
Some of the complexity deriving from innovation in structured product
design is the result of increasing sophistication and fine-tuning, and has
considerable beneficial effects for investors. After a certain point, however, either by design or in effect, the overall benefits flowing from everincreasing complexity become outweighed by their overall costs. As suggested in the Turner Review, the GFC has challenged the “underlying assumption of financial regulation in the US, the UK and across the world
… that financial innovation is by definition beneficial, since market discipline will winnow out any unnecessary or value destructive innovations.”136 In retrospect, some recent forms of financial innovation delivered few benefits but permitted rent-seeking and contributed to significantly increased systemic risk.137 As noted in the Turner Review:
it seems likely that some and perhaps much of the structuring and
trading activity involved in the complex version of securitised credit
[over the last ten to fifteen years], was not required to deliver credit
intermediation efficiently. Instead, it achieved an economic rent extraction made possible by the opacity of margins, the asymmetry of
information and knowledge between end users of financial services
and producers, and the structure of principal/agent relationships between investors and companies and between companies and individual employees.138

135

Ibid. at 7-32.

136

Turner, supra note 5 at 47.

137

Ibid. at 109.

138

Ibid. at 47.

38

(2010) 55 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL

One of the common arguments in favour of principles-based regulation
is that it supports innovation. While this continues to be an important
value, more thought needs to go into precisely how it supports innovation,
to what point innovation confers net benefits, and to whom those benefits
flow. A fundamental risk associated with principles-based regulation is
that, in the absence of the (at least putatively) immovable markers that
rules represent, there will be “creep” around the meaning of a term.139
Without regulatory oversight to ensure that terms are interpreted in a
reasonable and accountable manner, self-interested actors can be expected to define terms in their own interest. Where there is already underlying uncertainty—for example, around a new or extraordinarily complex product or line of business—or where there is no metric for evaluating something (e.g., a compliance program, a product, or a risk) across institutions, the problem can be exacerbated.140 “[R]isky shift”141 can occur,
especially when markets are experiencing a bubble or competitive pressures push actors toward greater risk-taking.142 Without countervailing,
independent-minded regulatory power to push back against selfinterested industry conduct, the “creep” may run downwards—toward
more risk, less transparency, less systemic stability, and less consumer
protection.
Meaningful regulatory oversight is therefore an important consideration, and complexity makes that oversight harder to achieve. We know
now that our financial regulatory approaches were not built to handle the
effects of complexity and constant innovation that characterize modern financial markets. Principles-based and collaborative regulation is, of
course, a response to those very phenomena. But as Jack Coffee and
Hillary Sale have argued, even an optimal regulatory model will not work
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if it is too complex for regulators to implement.143 In terms of the rulesversus-principles debate, this means taking into account both theory and
implementation when deciding how to structure particular regulatory
provisions. Ease of implementation by regulators may be an important
consideration. This consideration may weigh especially heavily where we
can identify that additional complexity resulting from structured product
design innovation is of diminishing marginal utility. There may be contexts in which (subject to the caveats below) rules’ greater ability to contain complexity helps justify a rules-based formulation over a principlesbased one, notwithstanding the significant costs to flexibility, innovation,
congruence, and prospectivity.
Capital requirements are a concrete example of where firms with
more rigid requirements weathered the acute phase of the fall 2008 credit
crisis better.144 As has been well documented, Canadian capital requirements for financial institutions are comparatively high, and even tend to
be exceeded by the actual practice of Canadian banks. Asset-to-capital ratios are capped at a comparatively low level.145 Canadian financial institutions’ overall success in weathering the GFC has been often attributed to
these regulatory restrictions.146 Another example, beyond the rulesversus-principles conversation, is contract term standardization. Especially with respect to derivative contracts, standardization can help rein
in complexity, make innovation subject to a degree of price discovery and
oversight, and make derivatives easier to regulate.147
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To use Colin Diver’s terms, capital requirements may be an area in
which, taking into account all the factors (e.g., poor regulatory oversight,
gaps in regulation, etc.), transparency and accessibility prove to be more
important than perfect congruence. In other words, if there is no clear and
forceful regulatory voice in the interpretive community around a regulatory principle, then the (ultimately superficial) certainty provided by (inevitably imperfect) rules will still prove more valuable than the flexibility
and contextuality provided by principles. This is especially the case when
one considers to whom benefits have flowed. The benefits of flexibility will
flow to those in a position to apply the principles. When there is no close
conversation with regulators about, for example, what constitutes meaningful disclosure with respect to complex structured products in the retail
market, then firms developing those products will decide on the meaning
of disclosure principles in light of their own interests.
We should also consider the role that particular regulatory requirements play in overall systemic stability and efficiency. Rules around capital requirements, like much of prudential regulation, are so fundamental
to effective functioning of the system that they should not necessarily be
subject to contestation, innovation, and potential “creep” through collaborative regulatory practice. The analogy in democratic theory would be to
participation rights, seen by some to be so fundamental to deliberation
that they should not themselves be subject to the risk of erosion in the
process of that deliberative exercise.148

International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc, online: ISDA <www.isda.org>).
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We should be careful not to overstate the lesson here. The fact that
systems with rigid, mandatory capital requirements performed better
during the financial crisis does not mean that such capital requirements
will necessarily be better than any more flexible alternative, or that we
can generalize from capital requirements to other areas of financial regulation. We did not learn that rigid capital requirements are better than
any mechanism we could possibly imagine. They may not even be better
than the CSE Program might have been, had it been buttressed by adequate regulatory capacity. Rigid requirements impose costs, too. What we
learned is that rigid capital requirements worked better than the flawed
and basically unaccountable capital adequacy system that was in place
under, for example, the SEC’s CSE Program.
It is helpful to see our current struggles with complexity as epistemological ones.149 Complexity is worrisome right now in part because, as was
the case in the frozen credit markets in the autumn of 2008, we do not
know what we do not know. In time, based on greater understanding, we
may be able to develop a more sophisticated approach to complexity, with
more and different safeguards in place, which does not seem to force us to
choose so starkly between flexibility and systemic stability. In other
words, existing bright-line capital requirements should be seen as prophlylactic, not permanent, rules. Prophylactic rules are clear and generally overdrawn requirements, like the Miranda rights-reading requirement for police in the United States, which serve as placeholders to protect an important interest until and unless a better, more tailored method
for achieving the same end can be implemented.150 A “better” approach to
capital requirements would have to improve flexibility and congruence,
but not at the expense of the transparency, accountability, and ease of ap-
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plication that rigid requirements provide in this crucial aspect of financial
markets regulation.151
Prophylactic rules are helpful in keeping essential systems functioning and in conserving regulatory resources. However, under conditions of
underlying factual uncertainty, rigid rules cannot resolve that uncertainty. Rigid rules will paper over uncertainty, forcing difficult interpretations underground—or alternatively forcing rule revisions through legislative processes that are far too cumbersome to be serviceable in “live”,
fast-moving systems. Principles-based regulation is a more promising long
term response to extreme complexity and consequent uncertainty, because it allows us to examine and discuss its effects explicitly, directly,
and openly. New governance generally is about designing the problemsolving architecture required for handling situations of extreme uncertainty, in which neither the precise ultimate goal nor the means for
achieving it can be determined in advance.152 This is the kind of environment in which it makes sense to enlist the context-specific knowledge of a
broad band of stakeholders in a collective, comparative, learning-by-doing
regulatory project, while not being naïve about the impact of self-interest
and power.
To summarize this paper’s recommendations thus far: in order to be
credible, principles-based regulation requires considerable regulatory capacity. It requires greater regulatory capacity in terms of numbers, resources, and expertise than has been allocated to it in some of the infamous examples of regulatory failure in the past two years—the failure of
Northern Rock in the United Kingdom, and of the the SEC’s CSE Program. At the same time, one should be realistic about regulatory capacity
when designing a regulatory regime. One should not design a system that
is too complex for actual regulators to implement. Bright-line prophylactic
rules, along with contract term standardization and other similar techniques, can help to conserve regulatory resources. Such rules around, for
example, capital requirements will be useful in the near future as we continue to grapple with the implications of complexity in the financial markets. Over the long term, however, a credible, principles-based, collaborative structure will be more robust and effective.
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C. Building Independence and Diversity into the Regulatory Architecture
A principles-based approach also has repercussions for the deep structure of regulation. For many, the GFC represents a fundamental challenge to the efficient market hypothesis, and indeed to the very place of
economic theory in developing public policy.153 This paper suggests that
we consider, instead, recent learning about macro-level regulatory design.
The task now (the completion of which is beyond the scope of this paper)
is to identify the structural and dialogical components that are essential
to ensuring that the principles-based regulatory architecture is robust
and credible. Chief among those components are mechanisms to ensure
parties’ accountability and to validate information.
Principles-based regulation replaces many tightly defined, statutorily
entrenched, and hard-to-revise legislative requirements with an ongoing,
information-based, pragmatic dialogue about good practices and regulatory goals.154 The shift itself is not determinative of choices between, for
example, industry self-regulation or intensive supervision.155 Nevertheless, it has practical implications for those policy choices. Under principles-based regulation, many of the bulwarks of detailed statutory law are
replaced by more easily revisable requirements. Recall the Table of Concordance between British Columbia’s existing and proposed Securities
Acts, which serves as a clear illustration of the volume of detailed decision
making that is moved out of the statute and into rule making under a
principes-based approach.156 At its best, principles-based regulation therefore makes possible a more sophisticated, informed, collaborative, flexible,
and transparent development of regulatory goals and means. At the same
time, such a deliberative, iterative process increases the number of “moving parts”, and makes the act of law-making more porous to external social forces and trends. What must replace detailed statutory precommitments is serious attention to the capacities, predispositions, and situation
of front-line decision makers, and to how the various participants in the
interpretive community can be expected to function together.
One way to think about the GFC is as a product of the marginalization
of overarching regulatory design considerations in favour of overbroad
faith in market discipline. There were obvious gaps in shadow banking
industry regulation. Great weight was placed on the shoulders of credit
153
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rating agencies, without adequate thought to ensuring that those agencies
were impartial and accountable.157 Regulators were not an effective counterweight against the banks in the Northern Rock158 and CSE Program
examples.159 In retrospect, programs like the CSE are paradoxes: on one
hand, regulators delegated risk assessment to firms explicitly because
they did not and could not possess the knowledge those firms had about
their own operational risks. Yet, the compensatory steps that might have
reduced the knowledge gap and ensured more meaningful oversight—
compliance audits, close supervision by adequate numbers of well-trained
staff—were not taken. Whether because the regimes’ regulator-level architects accepted too unthinkingly the laissez-faire ethos of recent
years,160 or because they had no choice given their lack of regulatory mandate from legislators161 (and these two are connected), regulatory programs like the SEC’s CSE Program lacked a commitment to a robust public role in either design or implementation.
Both the conflict of interest story and the overreliance on market discipline point to a troubling question that applies not only to the Northern
Rock failure or the CSE Program, but also to much of the bond and securities markets. The question is: from which quarter, exactly, was the independent critical thinking supposed to come? Jack Coffee’s memorable insight that the “gatekeepers” were one of the weak links that led to the Enron debacle resonates again today,162 but it needs to be generalized. These
are industries that are tightly enmeshed with their regulators and reputational intermediaries. Credit rating agencies were remunerated handsomely for giving good ratings to mortgage-backed securities. British
regulatory and financial services communities are characterized by con-

157

See Lowenstein, supra note 72; Partnoy, supra note 72.

158

See FSA, Northern Rock, supra note 121; see also discussion, supra note 125. The internal audit into the conduct of the FSA, during its supervision of Northern Rock, identified a number of situations in which FSA staff failed to appropriately challenge and
scrutinize information provided by Northern Rock. For example, the audit identified a
number of instances in which supervisors failed to conduct a “comprehensive analysis of
the risks inherent in the [Northern Rock] business model” (FSA, Northern Rock, supra
121 at 30). See also Turner, supra note 5 (discussing “intensive supervision” at 88-89).

159

See SEC Oversight, supra note 123; see also discussion supra note 126.

160

See Turner, supra note 5 (criticizing the FSA for adopting a “laissez-faire” mentality);
Stephen Labaton notes that “[t]he commission’s decision effectively to outsource its
oversight to the firms themselves fit squarely in the broader Washington culture of the
last eight years under President Bush” (supra note 85).

161

SEC Oversight, supra note 123 at 81-82 (Chairman Cox’s Comments justifying the CSE
Program on the basis that it was voluntary and the SEC did not otherwise have a mandate to regulate the CSE).

162

John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006).

PRINCIPLES-BASED SECURITIES REGULATION

45

siderable social overlap.163 Much has been written about the positions of
public power in the United States occupied by individuals formerly working in the private sector, and the potential adverse effects on public policy.164
In a provocative article in The Atlantic magazine, Simon Johnson has
argued that one of the causes of the financial crisis in the United States
was that the financial industry was dominated by oligarchs with ties to
government.165 Drawing on his experience working with developing nations at the International Monetary Fund, Johnson predicted that the
power of the oligarchs would also impede economic recovery because the
necessary bold steps to regulate industry would not be taken. The author
concludes that a destabilizing total collapse could be the “cleanse we need”
and that piecemeal steps taken to avoid confrontation with the oligarchs
would only prolong the pain. Without accepting that a “cleanse” is the
necessary course, Johnson’s experience underscores how damaging the
lack of an external, skeptical perspective can be when operating on an industry-wide (or even economies-wide) scale.
This paper does not argue that individuals with industry experience
should be barred from assuming positions of responsibility overseeing
those industries. The benefits of employing regulators with industry experience, in terms of expertise, perceived legitimacy with industry, and
persuasive force, are irreplaceable. Nor does this paper focus on the possibility that industry-regulator ties will consistently compromise prosecutions and enforcement actions.166 Beyond these important arguments
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about agency capture is a subtler worry about perspective. As Joseph E.
Stiglitz has observed, “[i]f those who are supposed to regulate the financial markets approach the problem from financial markets’ perspectives,
they will not provide an adequate check and balance.”167 Neither gatekeepers nor regulators will serve their function effectively if they are not
firmly rooted in an independent source of authority and meaning, which is
in active tension with their allegiances “within the circle” of those they
oversee. Such anchors help them resist the pull of groupthink, cascades,
and collective confusion that can take hold within a particular community—phenomena that are especially dangerous in principles-based regulation because of the degree of built-in fluidity.
An absence of diversity in perspective may also have implications for
an industry’s ability to self-regulate. Leaving aside regulatory failure, one
may ask why investment banks themselves did such a poor job of quantifying and managing the risks they were running. In multiple and intricately connected ways, firm culture can affect the degree to which a firm
is capable of acting independently in the face of competitive pressures and
behavioral cascades. Goldman Sachs famously managed to avoid some of
the worst excesses in mortgage-backed securities, arguably as a result of
its culture of “contrary thinking” relative to the rest of its industry.168 Internal diversity may also influence a firm’s stance toward risk-taking, as
Michael Lewis’s analysis of Icelandic banks and culture,169 as well as studies of the influence of gender in the financial services industry,170 suggest.
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Enforced self-regulation also stands the best chance of success when industry actors genuinely care about their broader reputations, something
that requires commitments and allegiances beyond one’s own firm and industry.171 All of this should lead us to wonder whether institutions that
draw on a broader range of perspectives may be better able to maintain
some cognitive distance from group pathologies, to their own advantage,
and to the advantage of an enforced self-regulatory approach.
This suggests a few specific reform recommendations. To begin with,
careful thought needs to be given as to how the various pieces of a principles-based regulatory approach will function together; where each actor’s
strengths and vulnerabilities lie, who is or is not participating in the interpretive community, and what is required to build checks and balances
into the system’s functioning.172 Credit rating agencies are an obvious example. If they are to continue to fulfill a central role as reputational intermediaries, they obviously need to be more independent and better
regulated than they recently have been. Regulators should also consider
making hiring decisions based not only on applicants’ relevant industry
and legal expertise, but also with a view to whether applicants seem to
have sufficient confidence and independence of mind (however obtained)
to keep them mindful of their distinct public role in the face of wellresourced and coordinated action from industry. Regulators in a principles-based or enforced self-regulatory regime should also watch for groupthink and behavioral cascades within their industry, and they may want
to give additional recognition or leeway to the views of industry outliers
when a cascade appears to be developing.173 This may ultimately call for a
richer description of the relationships between capital markets actors and
the other crucial social, institutional, and historical milieus in which they
are embedded—to understand which actors might “keep their heads” and
how to ensure their participation to that end.
Finally, a diversity of perspectives is important to principles-based
regulation at the macro level. Principles-based regulation will not function well if it is purely technocratic, closed, and expertise based. Technical
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expertise is not necessarily politically or socially neutral, and expertisebased models can shut down useful discussion. By contrast, principlesbased regulation is a system whose evolution depends not on modelling,
but on ongoing dialogue with stakeholders based on their real-life experience. Principles-based regulation is actually a different model from that
based on technical expertise: it derives its legitimacy from its collaborative, dialogic experience, and it operates on the basis that pragmatic,
learning-by-doing experience is a more reliable foundation than abstract
theory for regulatory policy development.174 The quality of the decisions
that emerge from its collaborative process, as well as the basic legitimacy
of that process, require broad participation. It also matters whether the
interpretive community that is engaged in filling in the details around a
principles-level regulatory requirement is sufficiently inclusive and diverse. That community must have enough common ground that its constituent parts can speak to each other and a certain degree of trust can
exist. At the same time, too much homogeneity limits the range of possibilities capable of being imagined.175 This calls for a regulatory architecture that specifically builds in opportunities for all key stakeholders to
participate.
For Julia Black, principles-based regulation at its fullest is a polycentric process that pulls in a wide variety of stakeholders.176 For the Expert
Panel as well, principles-based regulation needs to be supported by
greater investor participation guarantees, in the form of an independent
investor panel and dedicated investor issues groups.177 Broader stakeholder participation does not guarantee good regulatory outcomes, of
course. The FSA’s Consumer and Practitioner Panels did not prevent the
Northern Rock debacle.178 Stakeholder participation also introduces its
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own significant challenges.179 At the same time, one may ask what might
have happened, had the secret “war games” that revealed the risks that
Northern Rock posed to systemic stability been made public back in
2004.180

Conclusion
The GFC contains cautionary lessons about the risks associated with
principles-based regulation when it is not reinforced by a meaningful
regulatory presence. However, the response cannot be a knee-jerk reversion to either a more rules-based or a more command-and-control approach. Principles-based regulation accompanied by input from industry
was a direct response to a situation where regulators were underinformed, always playing catch-up, and made fools of not only by Enronstyle corporations engaging in “loophole behaviour,” but also (to harken
back to the negative image of 1970s bureaucracies) by their own rigid,
seized-up processes. The costs of a system that is too rule-based are also
considerable: it can stifle innovation, create loopholes and loopholeoriented behaviour, drive uncertainty “underground” and make problemsolving less explicit, and impose costs related to inflexibility. Principlesbased regulation needs to be understood as a response to those very real
problems.
Nor should we imagine that a return to older regulatory strategies
would avoid future frauds. There is no hope of returning the genies of financial innovation and complexity to the bottle. Under conditions of such
extreme uncertainty, ongoing interpretation of underlying principles is
the only feasible option. Facially straightforward rules cannot make a
complex situation simple. Detailed rules will be out of date by the time
they are drafted. Principles are attractive because they can adapt to
emerging events, and can adapt in a transparent and accountable way. By
contrast, rules must evolve either through time-consuming statutory
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amendment, or through selective or non-enforcement that conceals the
exercise of substantial regulatory discretion.
However, thought needs to be given as to how principles-based regulation perpetuates or even amplifies existing structural flaws in regulation.
To be effective, principles-based regulation must call for increasing regulatory resources, develop a thoughtful response to complexity (including a
place for prophylactic rules), and consciously incorporate a broader and
more independent range of perspectives into the regulatory discussion. As
Canada’s Expert Panel well appreciated, careful implementation and
meaningful enforcement are everything in building a strong principlesbased regulatory approach.181
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